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Warning for Hoosiers

edosmar May 13, 2011

  1. edosmar

    edosmar Average member

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    Unlock your doors, your Supreme Court says you have no right to resist UNLAWFULL police entry of your home.
     
  2. gpd215

    gpd215 Brigade Member Brigade Member

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    That's a completely bullshit statement.

    Support it with some facts or STFU
     
  3. siriusaudio

    siriusaudio THE SERIOUS™

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    I agree.

    The OP needs to provide a link.
     
  4. edosmar

    edosmar Average member

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    Last edited by a moderator: May 14, 2011
  5. TacoMan5000

    TacoMan5000 TacoDevilMan

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    Fucking. Bull. Shit.
     
  6. gpd215

    gpd215 Brigade Member Brigade Member

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    This is consistent with Indiana Law. Its also consistent with the majority of the other states, including Michigan. Indiana Law does not provide the right for anyone to fight with or resist a police officer in the performance of his or her duties for any reason. This does not change, alter or add anything to that.

    This does not give officers any more right to enter your home. They still have to follow all the rules that they used to. Officers action will be scrutinized by the police administration, the Criminal Courts and the Civil courts just the way they have been. This does not change, alter or add anything to that.

    Violence is not the answer to any situation. The Laws are set up by elected representatives. The laws are not set up by the police, or the Department heads. They are not set up by the courts either. They are interpreted in the courts.

    Did you even read the decision or are you just regurgitating what the Chicago Tribune is feeding you? Read the case. Its Richard L. Barnes v. State of Indiana. It would seem to me that the officers acted properly.
     
  7. Winter

    Winter Rampaging Sausage Knife Maker or Craftsman

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    WTF?

    PM me your address so I can send you a history book.
     
  8. edosmar

    edosmar Average member

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    Overturning a common law dating back to the English Magna Carta of 1215, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled Thursday that Hoosiers have no right to resist unlawful police entry into their homes.

    In a 3-2 decision, Justice Steven David writing for the court said if a police officer wants to enter a home for any reason or no reason at all, a homeowner cannot do anything to block the officer's entry.

    Justice David did not say that the police officer had to be working, in uniform, just that they had to be a police officer.

    The big words for me are (unlawful entry)

    The way it is stated in all reports I can find says that a homeowner cannot BLOCK an officers entry to their home. That means that if you lock your door you are blocking a police officer from entering and can now be arrested because you broke the law. B.S sure but just look at how many charges can be filed against someone when they are arrested. Justice David says the recourse for the homeowner is to hire an attorney and file charges. Sounds like he is just looking for another way to fill his and other attorneys pockets with other peoples money.

    I understand this started from a domestic call and that officers responding to them are called on to make decisions based on few facts, past experience, and gut feelings but this interpretation Is just wrong. Allowing police to enter anyones home whenever they choose for no reason and the ability to arrest then foe having their door locked is just nuts. I know, thats B.S. the police would never do that. Unless they want to.
     
  9. gpd215

    gpd215 Brigade Member Brigade Member

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    Where are you getting this from? Not from the Supreme Court majority decision or the or the dissenting Opinion? Again I'll ask...did you read the case or just media reports of the case?

    I agree that it is BS for a police officer or anyone to come into your house anytime they want to. I disagree that is what the ruling says. It sure the hell doesn't say that you cant lock your door.
     
  10. edosmar

    edosmar Average member

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    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Erin L. Berger Evansville, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of Indiana
    Karl M. Scharnberg Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    RICHARD L. BARNES,
    STATE OF INDIANA,
    In the Indiana Supreme Court
    _________________________________ No. 82S05-1007-CR-343
    Appellant (Defendant below),
    v.
    Appellee (Plaintiff below). _________________________________
    Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court, No. 82D02-0808-CM-759 The Honorable Mary Margaret Lloyd, Judge _________________________________
    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 82A05-0910-CR-592 _________________________________
    May 12, 2011
    David, Justice.
    A jury convicted Richard Barnes of Class A misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Barnes contests that the trial court‘s failure to advise the jury on the right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police officers constituted reversible error and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. We hold that there is no right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police officers. We further hold that the evidence was sufficient and affirm Barnes‘s convictions.
    Facts and Procedural History
    On November 18, 2007, Richard Barnes argued with his wife Mary Barnes as he was moving out of their apartment. During the argument, Mary tried to call her sister but Barnes grabbed the phone from her hand and threw it against the wall. Mary called 911 from her cell phone and informed the dispatcher that Barnes was throwing things around the apartment but that he had not struck her. The 911 dispatch went out as a ―domestic violence in progress.‖
    Officer Lenny Reed, the first responder, saw a man leaving an apartment with a bag and began questioning him in the parking lot. Upon identifying the man as Barnes, Reed informed him that officers were responding to a 911 call. Barnes responded that he was getting his things and leaving and that Reed was not needed. Barnes had raised his voice and yelled at Reed, prompting stares from others outside and several warnings from Reed.
    Officer Jason Henry arrived on the scene and observed that Barnes was ―very agitated and was yelling.‖ Barnes ―continued to yell, loudly‖ and did not lower his voice until Reed warned that he would be arrested for disorderly conduct. Barnes retorted, ―if you lock me up for Disorderly Conduct, you‘re going to be sitting right next to me in a jail cell.‖ Mary came onto the parking lot, threw a black duffle bag in Barnes‘s direction, told him to take the rest of his stuff, and returned to the apartment. Reed and Henry followed Barnes back to the apartment. Mary entered the apartment, followed by Barnes, who then turned around and blocked the doorway. Barnes told the officers that they could not enter the apartment and denied Reed‘s requests to enter and investigate. Mary did not explicitly invite the officers in, but she told Barnes several times, ―don‘t do this‖ and ―just let them in.‖ Reed attempted to enter the apartment, and Barnes shoved him against the wall. A struggle ensued, and the officers used a choke hold and a taser to subdue and arrest Barnes. Barnes suffered an adverse reaction to the taser and was taken to the hospital.
    Barnes was charged with Class A misdemeanor battery on a police officer, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime. Before the trial, Barnes tendered a jury
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    instruction on the right of a citizen to reasonably resist unlawful entry into the citizen‘s home.1 The trial court refused Barnes‘s instruction and did not otherwise instruct the jury as to the right to reasonably resist. The jury found Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer, resisting law enforcement, and disorderly conduct.
    Barnes appealed, challenging the trial court‘s refusal to give his tendered jury instruction and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court‘s refusal of Barnes‘s tendered jury instruction was not harmless error. Barnes v. State, 925 N.E.2d 420, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The Court of Appeals also found that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the disorderly conduct conviction. Id. at 426–29. The Court of Appeals therefore ordered a new trial on the battery and resisting charges. Id. at 429. We granted transfer.
    I. Jury Instruction
    Barnes contests that his tendered jury instruction should have been given because it was a correct statement of a viable legal defense supported by the facts and because that defense was not covered by the other instructions. We acknowledge that the Court of Appeals followed its own precedents in its analysis. Now this Court is faced for the first time with the question of whether Indiana should recognize the common-law right to reasonably resist unlawful entry by police officers. We conclude that public policy disfavors any such right. Accordingly, the trial court‘s refusal to give Barnes‘s tendered instruction was not error.
    The English common-law right to resist unlawful police action existed for over three hundred years, and some scholars trace its origin to the Magna Carta in 1215. Craig Hemmens & Daniel Levin, ―Not a Law at All‖: A Call for the Return to the Common Law Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1999). The United States Supreme Court recognized this right in Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535 (1900): ―If the officer had no right to arrest, the other party might resist the illegal attempt to arrest him, using no more force than was
    1 Barnes‘s tendered instruction is as follows:
    When an arrest is attempted by means of a forceful and unlawful entry into a citizen‘s home, such entry represents the use of excessive force, and the arrest cannot be considered peaceable. Therefore, a citizen has the right to reasonably resist the unlawful entry.
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    absolutely necessary to repel the assault constituting the attempt to arrest.‖ The Supreme Court has affirmed this right as recently as 1948. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948) (―One has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest, and courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases.‖).
    In the 1920s, legal scholarship began criticizing the right as valuing individual liberty over physical security of the officers. Hemmens & Levin, supra, at 18. One scholar noted that the common-law right came from a time where ―resistance to an arrest by a peace officer did not involve the serious dangers it does today.‖ Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 330 (1942). The Model Penal Code eliminated the right on two grounds: ―(1) the development of alternate remedies for an aggrieved arrestee, and (2) the use of force by the arrestee was likely to result in greater injury to the person without preventing the arrest.‖ Hemmens & Levin, supra, at 23. In response to this criticism, a majority of states have abolished the right via statutes in the 1940s and judicial opinions in the 1960s. Id. at 24–25.
    The Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Casselman v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1310, 1318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). In Casselman, the defendant did not appear at a judgment proceeding on the advice of his attorney. Id. at 1311. When the sheriff‘s deputy went to his home to effect a civil arrest, the defendant attempted to close the door in the deputy‘s face. A brief struggle ensued, and the defendant was arrested when he retreated into his house. Id. at 1311–12. The Court of Appeals found that the deputy ―was not lawfully engaged in the execution of civil process‖ when he prevented the defendant from closing the door to his home. Id. at 1314. Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged the trend of abolishing the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest, it ultimately focused on the heightened expectation of privacy in one‘s home and recognized a right to resist an unlawful entry into a home by a police officer. Id. at 1315–18.
    We believe however that a right to resist an unlawful police entry into a home is against public policy and is incompatible with modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Nowadays, an aggrieved arrestee has means unavailable at common law for redress against unlawful police action. E.g., Warner, supra, at 330 (citing the dangers of arrest at common law—indefinite detention, lack of bail, disease-infested prisons, physical torture—as reasons for recognizing the
    4
    right to resist); State v. Hobson, 577 N.W.2d 825, 835–36 (Wis. 1998) (citing the following modern developments: (1) bail, (2) prompt arraignment and determination of probable cause, (3) the exclusionary rule, (4) police department internal review and disciplinary procedure, and (5) civil remedies). We also find that allowing resistance unnecessarily escalates the level of violence and therefore the risk of injuries to all parties involved without preventing the arrest— as evident by the facts of this instant case. E.g., Hobson, 577 N.W.2d at 836 (―But in arrest situations that are often ripe for rapid escalation, one‘s ̳measured‘ response may fast become excessive.‖). Further, we note that a warrant is not necessary for every entry into a home. For example, officers may enter the home if they are in ―hot pursuit‖ of the arrestee or if exigent circumstances justified the entry. E.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (holding that retreat into a defendant‘s house could not thwart an otherwise proper arrest made in the course of a ―hot pursuit‖); Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 938 (Ind. 2006) (―Possible imminent destruction of evidence is one exigent circumstance that may justify a warrantless entry into a home if the fear on the part of the police that the evidence was immediately about to be destroyed is objectively reasonable.‖). Even with a warrant, officers may have acted in good faith in entering a home, only to find later that their entry was in error. E.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1994); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–25 (1984). In these situations, we find it unwise to allow a homeowner to adjudge the legality of police conduct in the heat of the moment. As we decline to recognize a right to resist unlawful police entry into a home, we decline to recognize a right to batter a police officer as a part of that resistance.
    Here, the trial court‘s failure to give the proffered jury instruction was not error. Because we decline to recognize the right to reasonably resist an unlawful police entry, we need not decide the legality of the officers‘ entry into Barnes‘s apartment. We note, however, that the officers were investigating a ―domestic violence in progress‖ in response to a 911 call. A 911 call generally details emergency or exigent circumstances requiring swift police action. In these cases, the officers are responding to rapidly changing or escalating events, and their initial response is often based on limited information. The officers cannot properly assess the complaint and the dangers to those threatened without some limited access to the involved parties. It is unrealistic to expect officers to wait for threats to escalate and for violence to become imminent before intervening. Here, the officers acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances.
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    In sum, we hold that Indiana the right to reasonably resist an unlawful police entry into a home is no longer recognized under Indiana law. Accordingly, the trial court‘s failure to give Barnes‘s proffered jury instruction on this right was not error.
    II. Sufficiency of Evidence
    Barnes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery on a police officer, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The standard of review for sufficiency-of-evidence claims is well settled. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we respect ―the jury‘s exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence.‖ Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind. 2001). We ―consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.‖ McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We affirm ―if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ind. 2000).
    A. Disorderly Conduct
    To prove that Barnes committed Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, the State needed to prove that Barnes recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally made unreasonable noise and continued to do so after being asked to stop. Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(2) (2004). Because one‘s conduct or expression may be free speech protected under the Indiana Constitution, an application of the disorderly conduct statute must pass constitutional scrutiny. We employ a two-step inquiry in reviewing the constitutionality of an application of the disorderly conduct statute: we (1) ―determine whether state action has restricted a claimant‘s expressive activity‖ and (2) ―decide whether the restricted activity constituted an ̳abuse‘ of the right to speak.‖ Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1996). The first prong may be satisfied based solely on the police restricting a claimant‘s loud speaking during a police investigation. Id. at 1370. The second prong hinges on whether the restricted expression constituted political speech. Id. at 1369–70. If the claimant demonstrates under an objective standard that the impaired expression was political speech, the impairment is unconstitutional unless the State demonstrates that the ―magnitude of the impairment‖ is slight or that the speech amounted to a public nuisance
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    such that it ―inflict[ed] ̳particularized harm‘ analogous to tortious injury on readily identifiable private interests.‖ Id. (quoting Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 964 (Ind. 1993)). If the expression, viewed in context, is ambiguous, it is not political speech, and we evaluate the constitutionality of the impairment under standard rationality review. Id. at 1370. Here, Barnes argues that his speech—i.e., his yelling at and threats to the investigating officers—constituted protected political speech.
    We resolved an analogous issue in a juvenile case in J.D. v. State, 859 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. 2007). In J.D., an officer investigating a complaint against the juvenile approached her to find a peaceable solution, with an arrest as ―the last resort.‖ Id. at 343. The juvenile loudly interrupted the officer‘s attempts to speak to her and did not respond to requests to ―stop hollering.‖ Id. After she was threatened with arrest, she continued to speak over the officer and was arrested. Id. The juvenile challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court‘s adjudication of delinquency for commission of disorderly conduct, arguing that her conduct was protected political speech. Id. at 343–44. We distinguished the facts of J.D. with that of Price, where the defendant loudly objected to the arrest of another person and the officers‘ threats to arrest her for her protest. Id. at 344. We found that in Price, ―the defendant‘s speech did not obstruct or interfere with the police,‖ whereas the juvenile‘s alleged political speech in J.D. hampered the officer‘s ability to perform his law enforcement duties. Id. We believe the facts of the present case are closer to the facts in J.D. Barnes‘s speech in the present case is that of a person of interest refusing to cooperate with a police investigation and is not within the contours of political speech contemplated by Price. Even assuming Barnes‘s conduct was political speech, the ―magnitude of impairment‖ is de minimis. Accordingly, Barnes‘s yelling at the officers, even after they warned him to calm down, was sufficient to sustain his disorderly conduct conviction.
    B. Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer
    To prove that Barnes committed Class A misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer, the State needed to demonstrate that Barnes knowingly or intentionally touched the officer in a rude, insolent, or angry manner while the officer was engaged in the execution of his official duty. I.C. § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(B). The State argues that Barnes battered Officer Reed by
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    ―shoving him into a door.‖ Barnes does not dispute the evidence establishing that he shoved Reed, who was responding to Mary‘s 911 call, but he argues that his conduct was a lawful response to Reed‘s allegedly unlawful entry into his apartment. Because we decline to recognize the right of a homeowner to reasonably resist unlawful entry, Barnes is not entitled to batter Reed, irrespective as to the legality of Reed‘s entry.
    C. Resisting Arrest
    To prove that Barnes committed Class A resisting arrest, the State needed to demonstrate that Barnes knowingly or intentionally forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law enforcement officer while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties. I.C. § 35-44-3-3(a). The State argues that Barnes struggled with the officers and resisted their attempt to arrest him for battering Reed. As before, Barnes does not dispute his struggle with the officers but contests that his conduct was a lawful response to the officers‘ allegedly unlawful entry into his apartment. Because Barnes is not entitled to resist the entry of the officers, his battery on Reed was sufficient grounds for his arrest, and the uncontroverted fact that he resisted the arrest was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
    Conclusion
    Barnes‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
    Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, J., concur. Dickson, J. dissents with a separate opinion. Rucker, J. dissents with a separate opinion in which Dickson, J. concurs.
    YES.
     
  11. siriusaudio

    siriusaudio THE SERIOUS™

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    I'm not going to quote the most recent post because it's too fucking long so here's my question for that edosmar guy:


    Where in your copy and pasting of the court document does it say that an off-duty police officer can just walk into your house with no cause?

    It doesn't.

    Period.

    Get your shit straight on laws and procedures by police officers.

    Also, locking your door is not considered "resisting." In order to resist arrest you must be actively not complying with the officer's commands.
     
  12. norcal13

    norcal13 rated "e" for evil Brigade Member

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    but it does take away the right to defend your
    home from intrusion by a police officer who is
    breaking the law.
     
  13. hot.soapy

    hot.soapy Hot and Soapy Devil

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    this law is just putting cops in danger. its a false sense of security. hoosiers are some of the most well armed folks I know. anyone entering someone else's castle uninvited is asking for trouble or worse.
     
    Last edited by a moderator: May 15, 2011
  14. gpd215

    gpd215 Brigade Member Brigade Member

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    I would agree with that.

    Hoosiers definitely have lots of guns and knives. Police Officer's make entry into people's homes everyday, often times uninvited. All this does is say that someone who responds with violence could face a criminal charge. It doesn't change when officers can enter a home or the criminal, civil and disciplinary actions that would come with an unlawful entry.
     
    Last edited by a moderator: May 15, 2011
  15. norcal13

    norcal13 rated "e" for evil Brigade Member

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    but it is putting officers judgements above the fourth amendment.

    if the inherent right's recognized by the bill of rights
    are truly endowed by our creator, why is it a crime
    to physically stop government agents from violating
    those rights?

    am i now to believe law enforcement officers whims trump that of my creator?

    anyone else pushing into my home is a threat to my personal safety, to
    be met with force....but not the government?

    in the original case it seemed to be a good judgement call on the
    part of the officers, but this ruling is a further erosion of what i
    believe were the intentions of our forefathers when they drafted
    the constitution and bill of rights.

    time will tell......
     
  16. SugarSkull

    SugarSkull Ring Of Bone

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    The Warrent is on Our Computer

    2010
     
  17. norcal13

    norcal13 rated "e" for evil Brigade Member

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    if the wife and son said he was at the residence
    and they have a warrant for the sons arrest.....
    ......he's going to jail.
     
  18. gpd215

    gpd215 Brigade Member Brigade Member

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    The fourth amendment is used to establish procedure and judge after the fact, and I don't think this changes that. The Officer's judgment, training, experience and supervision are the key to an Officers decision. Police work is a job and most Officer's want to keep their jobs. An Officer's entry will still be judged by the fourth amendment standard which has not changed and the consequences for violating it will still be the same. An illegal entry on your home is not worth losing ones job.

    I agree with most everything else you posted.
     
  19. norcal13

    norcal13 rated "e" for evil Brigade Member

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    where i live illegal home entry happens with
    mundane regularity.

    no one loses their job.

    in fact they just get transferred to the task force.

    but i'm only talking about my oddball county.

    it's a fucking free-for-all in mendocino county.
     

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